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	<title>Comments on: How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of the U.S. Banking System</title>
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	<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/</link>
	<description>Global Investment News</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 13 Feb 2012 18:41:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: Only Tighter Regulation Will Stem this Crisis of Confidence</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-9199</link>
		<dc:creator>Only Tighter Regulation Will Stem this Crisis of Confidence</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Dec 2009 14:16:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-9199</guid>
		<description>[...] specific products – structured collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and credit default swaps (CDS) – are “derivative” products that stand out as being [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] specific products – structured collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and credit default swaps (CDS) – are “derivative” products that stand out as being [...]</p>
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		<title>By: How Credit Default Swaps Could Reverse the Economic Recovery</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1984</link>
		<dc:creator>How Credit Default Swaps Could Reverse the Economic Recovery</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2009 09:38:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1984</guid>
		<description>[...] bad enough that the regulators who came before the FHFA were inept, but what is happening now under the FHFA is far worse, and actually has the potential to [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] bad enough that the regulators who came before the FHFA were inept, but what is happening now under the FHFA is far worse, and actually has the potential to [...]</p>
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		<title>By: As the Credit Crisis Deepens, There Are Still Many More Questions Than Answers</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1983</link>
		<dc:creator>As the Credit Crisis Deepens, There Are Still Many More Questions Than Answers</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2009 15:47:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1983</guid>
		<description>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the U.S. Credit Crisis (Part III):  How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th.... [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the U.S. Credit Crisis (Part III):  How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th&#8230;. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: While Lawmakers Reach Credit Crisis Compromise, Money Morning Bailout Plan Expert Displays Doubt</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1982</link>
		<dc:creator>While Lawmakers Reach Credit Crisis Compromise, Money Morning Bailout Plan Expert Displays Doubt</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 16:10:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1982</guid>
		<description>[...] else. If you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published Wednesday. In his &#8220;Open Letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] else. If you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published Wednesday. In his &ldquo;Open Letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman [...]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Dear Hank: Here's How to End the Credit Crisis at No Cost to Taxpayers</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1981</link>
		<dc:creator>Dear Hank: Here's How to End the Credit Crisis at No Cost to Taxpayers</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 16:05:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1981</guid>
		<description>[...] [Editor&#039;s Note: Contributing Editor R. Shah Gilani has toiled in the trading pits in Chicago, run trading desks in New York, operated as a broker/dealer and managed everything from hedge funds to currency accounts. In his just-completed three-part investigation of the U.S. credit crisis, Gilani was able to provide insider insights that no other financial writer or commentator could hope to match. He drew upon the experiences and network of contacts that he developed through the years to provide Money Morning readers with the &quot;real story&quot; of the credit crisis. It&#039;s a perspective on the near-financial meltdown that you&#039;ll find nowhere else. If you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published yesterday (Wednesday).] [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] [Editor's Note: Contributing Editor R. Shah Gilani has toiled in the trading pits in Chicago, run trading desks in New York, operated as a broker/dealer and managed everything from hedge funds to currency accounts. In his just-completed three-part investigation of the U.S. credit crisis, Gilani was able to provide insider insights that no other financial writer or commentator could hope to match. He drew upon the experiences and network of contacts that he developed through the years to provide Money Morning readers with the &quot;real story&quot; of the credit crisis. It's a perspective on the near-financial meltdown that you'll find nowhere else. If you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published yesterday (Wednesday).] [...]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Is President Obama's Banking Bailout Plan Destined to be a Dud?</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1980</link>
		<dc:creator>Is President Obama's Banking Bailout Plan Destined to be a Dud?</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2009 10:01:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1980</guid>
		<description>[...] In the worldview of Geithner, and other like-minded economists, credit, rather than savings, is the central figure in the economic equation. Therefore, the new Treasury secretary sees anything that eases the process of lending to be an effective economic policy. With such a view in mind, the centerpiece of Geithner&#8217;s plan is the commitment of as much as $1 trillion to revive the collapsed market for securitized debt. In the run-up to the Crash of 2008, it was securitization - more than anything else - that permitted Americans to borrow more than they .... [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] In the worldview of Geithner, and other like-minded economists, credit, rather than savings, is the central figure in the economic equation. Therefore, the new Treasury secretary sees anything that eases the process of lending to be an effective economic policy. With such a view in mind, the centerpiece of Geithner's plan is the commitment of as much as $1 trillion to revive the collapsed market for securitized debt. In the run-up to the Crash of 2008, it was securitization &#8211; more than anything else &#8211; that permitted Americans to borrow more than they &#8230;. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Cangrande</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1979</link>
		<dc:creator>Cangrande</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jan 2009 20:12:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1979</guid>
		<description>Thank you from Germany for your informative series on various financial &#039;instruments&#039;.

While I would not be bold enough to claim that I now truly comprehend the financial crisis, I do feel like getting some ground under my feet in understanding the technical dimension of the disaster.

Thank you!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thank you from Germany for your informative series on various financial 'instruments'.</p>
<p>While I would not be bold enough to claim that I now truly comprehend the financial crisis, I do feel like getting some ground under my feet in understanding the technical dimension of the disaster.</p>
<p>Thank you!</p>
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		<title>By: How U.S. Missteps Triggered a Spiral of Worldwide Margin Calls and Deepened the Financial Crisis &#124; triggereventstrategist.com</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1978</link>
		<dc:creator>How U.S. Missteps Triggered a Spiral of Worldwide Margin Calls and Deepened the Financial Crisis &#124; triggereventstrategist.com</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Dec 2008 22:45:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1978</guid>
		<description>[...] complexity of collateralized mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) is beyond any simple explanation, though I offered one a few weeks ago. Second, and exponentially worse is that there is a “multiplier catalyst” in this devastating [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] complexity of collateralized mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) is beyond any simple explanation, though I offered one a few weeks ago. Second, and exponentially worse is that there is a “multiplier catalyst” in this devastating [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Study of Great Depression&#160; Shows Intervention Postpones Foreclosures, But Causes Mortgage Rates to Spike</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1977</link>
		<dc:creator>Study of Great Depression&#160; Shows Intervention Postpones Foreclosures, But Causes Mortgage Rates to Spike</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 21:17:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1977</guid>
		<description>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the U.S. Credit Crisis (Part III):  How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th.... [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the U.S. Credit Crisis (Part III):  How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th&#8230;. [...]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: For the U.S. Economy in the New Year, the Pain Will Precede the Promise</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1976</link>
		<dc:creator>For the U.S. Economy in the New Year, the Pain Will Precede the Promise</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2008 21:37:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1976</guid>
		<description>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the U.S. Credit Crisis (Part III):  How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th.... [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the U.S. Credit Crisis (Part III):  How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th&#8230;. [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: Ending the Credit Crisis: The &#8220;Money Morning 15-Point Plan&#8221; &#124; Investment Advice and Investment Research with a Contrarian Point of View</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1975</link>
		<dc:creator>Ending the Credit Crisis: The &#8220;Money Morning 15-Point Plan&#8221; &#124; Investment Advice and Investment Research with a Contrarian Point of View</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2008 16:23:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1975</guid>
		<description>[...] can find each part of Gilani&#8217;s investigative series here: Part I, Part II and Part III. To get a free copy of &#8220;Crash Proof&#8221; courtesy of Money Morning, and learn how to grow [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] can find each part of Gilani's investigative series here: Part I, Part II and Part III. To get a free copy of "Crash Proof" courtesy of Money Morning, and learn how to grow [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: How U.S. Missteps Triggered a Spiral of Worldwide Margin Calls and Deepened the Financial Crisis</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1974</link>
		<dc:creator>How U.S. Missteps Triggered a Spiral of Worldwide Margin Calls and Deepened the Financial Crisis</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2008 10:32:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1974</guid>
		<description>[...] complexity of collateralized mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) is beyond any simple explanation, though I offered one a few weeks ago. Second, and exponentially worse is that there is a &#8220;multiplier catalyst&#8221; in this [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] complexity of collateralized mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) is beyond any simple explanation, though I offered one a few weeks ago. Second, and exponentially worse is that there is a &ldquo;multiplier catalyst&rdquo; in this [...]</p>
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	<item>
		<title>By: Inside the Credit Crisis: How the Fed&#8217;s Efforts to Lower the Fed Funds Rate May Leave it Powerless to Stop the Financial Meltdown</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1967</link>
		<dc:creator>Inside the Credit Crisis: How the Fed&#8217;s Efforts to Lower the Fed Funds Rate May Leave it Powerless to Stop the Financial Meltdown</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2008 09:34:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1967</guid>
		<description>[...] you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani&#8217;s plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani&rsquo;s plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry [...]</p>
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		<title>By: The current global financial crisis at raining ktula</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1959</link>
		<dc:creator>The current global financial crisis at raining ktula</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2008 02:25:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1959</guid>
		<description>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the Credit Crisis (Part III): How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th.... [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Money Morning Special Investigation of the Credit Crisis (Part III): How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism and Myopic Regulation Caused a Near-Meltdown of th&#8230;. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Credit Crisis Update: An Inside Look at the Commercial Paper Debacle &#124; Jutia Group</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1960</link>
		<dc:creator>Credit Crisis Update: An Inside Look at the Commercial Paper Debacle &#124; Jutia Group</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2008 16:38:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1960</guid>
		<description>[...] you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani&#8217;s plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani&rsquo;s plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Credit-Crisis Update: An Inside Look at the Commercial Paper Debacle</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1965</link>
		<dc:creator>Credit-Crisis Update: An Inside Look at the Commercial Paper Debacle</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Oct 2008 13:02:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1965</guid>
		<description>[...] you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani&#8217;s plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani&rsquo;s plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry [...]</p>
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		<title>By: By Relaxing “Market-to-Market” Rules, Has the U.S. Switched Off its Financial Crisis Early Warning System? &#124; Jutia Group</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1957</link>
		<dc:creator>By Relaxing “Market-to-Market” Rules, Has the U.S. Switched Off its Financial Crisis Early Warning System? &#124; Jutia Group</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 15:14:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1957</guid>
		<description>[...] each bank relying on its own internal model to value the &#8220;toxic waste&#8221; on its balance sheet, investors would no longer be able to compare the financial statements [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] each bank relying on its own internal model to value the &ldquo;toxic waste&rdquo; on its balance sheet, investors would no longer be able to compare the financial statements [...]</p>
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		<title>By: By Relaxing &#8220;Market-to-Market&#8221; Rules, Has the U.S. Switched Off its Financial Crisis Early Warning System?</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1972</link>
		<dc:creator>By Relaxing &#8220;Market-to-Market&#8221; Rules, Has the U.S. Switched Off its Financial Crisis Early Warning System?</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 13:27:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1972</guid>
		<description>[...] each bank relying on its own internal model to value the &#8220;toxic waste&#8221; on its balance sheet, investors would no longer be able to compare the financial statements [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] each bank relying on its own internal model to value the &ldquo;toxic waste&rdquo; on its balance sheet, investors would no longer be able to compare the financial statements [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Why the Senate Bailout Bill Will Fail Taxpayers</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1958</link>
		<dc:creator>Why the Senate Bailout Bill Will Fail Taxpayers</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2008 00:12:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1958</guid>
		<description>[...] If you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani&#039;s plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] If you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Sept. 18, Part II ran Sept. 22 and Part III was published Sept. 24. Gilani's plan was published on Sept. 25 as an open letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: CDOs - Burbuja Económica</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1973</link>
		<dc:creator>CDOs - Burbuja Económica</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 22:55:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1973</guid>
		<description>[...] else. If you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published yesterday (Wednesday).]    Dear Hank: Here&#039;s How to End the Credit Crisis at No Cost to Taxpayers  Otra cosa. El autor de [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] else. If you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published yesterday (Wednesday).]    Dear Hank: Here's How to End the Credit Crisis at No Cost to Taxpayers  Otra cosa. El autor de [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Sunshine Kills Vampires &#187; An Alternative to a $700 BILLION Blank or Counter-signed Check</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1966</link>
		<dc:creator>Sunshine Kills Vampires &#187; An Alternative to a $700 BILLION Blank or Counter-signed Check</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Sep 2008 09:35:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1966</guid>
		<description>[...] else. If you missed Gilani&#039;s investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published Wednesday. In his “Open Letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] else. If you missed Gilani's investigative series, Part I appeared Friday, Part II ran Monday and Part III was published Wednesday. In his “Open Letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Sunshine Kills Vampires &#187; BAIL-OUT: Build a better mouse-trap than Paulson&#8217;s?</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1971</link>
		<dc:creator>Sunshine Kills Vampires &#187; BAIL-OUT: Build a better mouse-trap than Paulson&#8217;s?</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2008 08:56:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1971</guid>
		<description>[...] can find each part of Gilani&#8217;s investigative series here: Part I, Part II and Part III. To get a free copy of &#8220;Crash Proof&#8221; courtesy of Money Morning, and learn how to grow [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] can find each part of Gilani's investigative series here: Part I, Part II and Part III. To get a free copy of "Crash Proof" courtesy of Money Morning, and learn how to grow [...]</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>By: chris erickson</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1964</link>
		<dc:creator>chris erickson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 04:19:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1964</guid>
		<description>P S forgot to add that seeing as that the banks are selling at a discount when they forclose , would it be eaiser to just write down their existing loans by 25% &amp; lower the instrest rate  it would be cheaper rthat the cost of foreclosure &amp; resale at a lower rate / price which they are doing now .....????????????????????????????????????????</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>P S forgot to add that seeing as that the banks are selling at a discount when they forclose , would it be eaiser to just write down their existing loans by 25% &amp; lower the instrest rate  it would be cheaper rthat the cost of foreclosure &amp; resale at a lower rate / price which they are doing now &#8230;..????????????????????????????????????????</p>
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		<title>By: chris erickson</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1963</link>
		<dc:creator>chris erickson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2008 04:05:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1963</guid>
		<description>I agree with what was said ; but if we do have to purschase
these instruments as the fed &amp; pres says then lets do it like a bank fire sale , discount them 25% to start then an additional
50% from  that value &quot; not face valve as stated &quot; .. I dont think it shoukld matter wheither it is a foreign  country or a us company , no purschase at face/stated value....all of the banks/investment houses have had to sell their instruments at 30 to 20% of face value... also any income derivied sholud be used to pay of the national debt.. then reinstate the regulations &amp; over site rules that were in place in the 80&#039;s which both bush&#039;s have seen fit to over turn./get rid of or igbnore.. in addition use fanni &amp; freddi to lower instrest rates for all the existing  loans to 4.5 %  for 3 years then let new loans afterthat float at market... also fanni &amp; freddi should not be returned baxck to the private sector , they should be ketp by the gov  being that is where they started  &amp; all the income should also be used to pay of the debt...at the same time all the ceo&#039;s &amp; managers wich caused this mess should have to work without pay for 3 years to help fix this mess ; if they dont want to then give them the boot with no severance pay/golden  parachute .. &amp; if they want a job tell . to try mcdonalds. If i screw up I have to pay for it &amp; no one bails me out.....
I hope / pray somebody in washington has their head on straight  &amp; doen&#039;t give them all for nought... it would be a shame ... if this opportunity was wasted.....</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with what was said ; but if we do have to purschase<br />
these instruments as the fed &amp; pres says then lets do it like a bank fire sale , discount them 25% to start then an additional<br />
50% from  that value " not face valve as stated " .. I dont think it shoukld matter wheither it is a foreign  country or a us company , no purschase at face/stated value&#8230;.all of the banks/investment houses have had to sell their instruments at 30 to 20% of face value&#8230; also any income derivied sholud be used to pay of the national debt.. then reinstate the regulations &amp; over site rules that were in place in the 80's which both bush's have seen fit to over turn./get rid of or igbnore.. in addition use fanni &amp; freddi to lower instrest rates for all the existing  loans to 4.5 %  for 3 years then let new loans afterthat float at market&#8230; also fanni &amp; freddi should not be returned baxck to the private sector , they should be ketp by the gov  being that is where they started  &amp; all the income should also be used to pay of the debt&#8230;at the same time all the ceo's &amp; managers wich caused this mess should have to work without pay for 3 years to help fix this mess ; if they dont want to then give them the boot with no severance pay/golden  parachute .. &amp; if they want a job tell . to try mcdonalds. If i screw up I have to pay for it &amp; no one bails me out&#8230;..<br />
I hope / pray somebody in washington has their head on straight  &amp; doen't give them all for nought&#8230; it would be a shame &#8230; if this opportunity was wasted&#8230;..</p>
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		<title>By: Rick Pelley</title>
		<link>http://moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/comment-page-1/#comment-1970</link>
		<dc:creator>Rick Pelley</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2008 17:58:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/09/24/financial-meltdown/#comment-1970</guid>
		<description>An addendum to my prior comment:

Now, in our lifetime, that this ugly financial worldwide “thing” is already “on the run” to its unprecedented end, some readers may be wondering “how” the “thinking and prudent among us” might “prepare hearts and minds” for the very “worst”.

There does exist a most worthwhile and very useful answer to the question.

But requires “deep” thought and reflection.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An addendum to my prior comment:</p>
<p>Now, in our lifetime, that this ugly financial worldwide “thing” is already “on the run” to its unprecedented end, some readers may be wondering “how” the “thinking and prudent among us” might “prepare hearts and minds” for the very “worst”.</p>
<p>There does exist a most worthwhile and very useful answer to the question.</p>
<p>But requires “deep” thought and reflection.</p>
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