Why was the S&L Crisis not a Systemic Economic Crisis?

Global Economic Intersection Article of the Week

Some of the most important examples of criminogenic behavior and control fraud in our history were encountered and eventually resolved during the S&L crisis era. And yet we went on to repeat the same behavior patterns in the immediately following twenty years. Before trying to answer the title question, a historical timeline is necessary for reference. The major events and dates are outlined in the first section which follows.

S&L Crisis Timeline - Major Events

1979 - Paul Volcker appointed Federal Reserve Chairman by Pres. Carter.

1979-1981 - Volcker's Fed raises federal funds rate to a high of 20% in June, 1981.

1981 - Richard T. Pratt appointed chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board), the national regulator for S&Ls by Pres. Reagan.

1982 - Pres. Reagan signs the Garn-St. Germain Act deregulating S&Ls. Bill was proposed by Pratt.

1983 - Pratt resigns and is replaced as chairman fellow board member by Edwin Gray.

1987 - Pres. Reagan appoints M. Danny Wall as chairman, declining to reappoint Gray.

1989 - Pres. George H. W. Bush signs taxpayer-financed bailout measure known as the FIRREA authorizing $50 billion to close failed banks.

1990 - M. Danny Wall resigns as Bank Board chairman, under pressure (re-Lincoln S&L).

1990 - Pres. George H.W. Bush appoints Timothy Ryan as chairman.

1986-1995 - Over 1,000 banks with total assets of over $500 billion failed.

1999 - Crisis cost was determined to be $153 billion, with taxpayers footing the bill for $124 billion, and the S&L industry paying the rest.

Beat Inflation, Break the Bank

Fed Chairman Paul Volcker's inflation control efforts in the late 1970s and early 1980s did great damage to S&Ls, which were overwhelmingly portfolio lenders making long-term, fixed rate mortgages funded by extremely short-term deposits.

S&Ls were exposed to severe interest rate risk. On a market value basis, the industry was insolvent by roughly $150 billion by mid-1982. Bank Board Chairman Pratt (an academic expert in "modern finance" who had served as the S&L trade association's top economist) drafted a bill (informally known then as "the Pratt bill") modeled on state of Texas deregulation. Deregulating at a time of mass insolvency was significantly insane, but Pratt was an anti-regulator of great fervor. Using econometric techniques to choose Texas as the model - without recognizing that Texas S&Ls' superior reported income was as fictional (reported income and capital arising from merging two insolvent, unprofitable S&Ls) - was insane and caused severe losses.

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